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Tatarstan and illustrates how federal arrangements operate to diffuse ethnopolitical 
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sources, and interviews from fieldwork in Russia, the article identifies ways in which the 
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Union. Even though federalism has got negative publicity in former communist 
countries, particularly following the collapse of communism, the case of Tatarstan 
suggests ways through which federal institutions enable cooperation between Russians 
and Tatars. In addition, the article considers recent pitfalls the two sides have had to 
overcome and broader implications for federalism and reconciliation studies in general. 
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Introduction 
“When the Tatars were in charge, they acted like monsters. They stole from the 
Russians.” A Russian friend said that to me while I was in Nizhny Novgorod visiting. 
The time of the Tatar Yoke—the three centuries preceding Ivan the Terrible’s 16th 
century conquest of the area that became Tatarstan—left an indelible mark upon the 
Russian psyche. For their part, Tatars remember the time of Ivan’s conquest as an age 
of forced conversion, destroyed mosques, and “Tatar suburbs”—areas akin to the 
ghettos of Eastern Europe and the projects of the United States where Tatars were 
forced to live (Mukhetdinov 2010). These two ethnic groups have historically been 
adversaries, and their cultural memory shows it. But today they share space within 
Russia peacefully, a model of cultural accommodation. The vast majority of ethnic 
Russians are Orthodox Christians, culturally if not religiously; the Tatars are the largest 
Muslim ethnic group living within the Russian Federation.  
Russia is not without violent conflict, with Islamic separatists in Chechnya, 
Dagestan, and Ingushetia all occupying much of the Russian government’s attention. In 
this context it is remarkable how peaceful inter-ethnic relations between Tatars and 
Russians are. The popular imagination holds that Western societies cannot coexist with 
Islamic ones, and that when Islam encounters other religious or cultural ideologies—
particularly Western or Christian ones—that conflict inevitably follows. While being 
interviewed Firdaus Vagapova mentioned a poll conducted in the 1990’s that asked 
Tatars and Russians about their attitudes towards each other, and the results of the 
poll showed that Tatars and Russians were actually highly favourably inclined towards 
each other (Vagapova 2010). How then, do Tatars and Russians retain such good 
relations in the face of numerous historical reasons to be antagonistic? The answer is 
predictably complicated, and the reasons are difficult to separate from each other; but a 
combination of Soviet urban policy, open religious dialogue, broad federal autonomy, 
and a local emphasis enabled by Russia’s federal government on shared cultural 
history and values keeps the peace between Russians and Tatars. 
1. Mutual Subjugation 
The story starts far earlier than one might believe. In 1228 the Mongols moved through 
what became the Russian heartland and conquered everyone in their path. At this time 
the Tatars did not exist as they currently conceive of themselves; instead they called 
themselves the Bulgars. When the Mongols invaded they were not yet Muslim, but the 
Bulgars were. After the Mongols converted in the 13th century, the Bulgars were ideally 
placed to help administer the conquered area. This is the moment that the Mongol yoke 
became the Tatar Yoke in the eyes of Russians (Hunter 2004, 144). Over time the 
Bulgars and the Mongols merged together to become what are now known as the 
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Tatars, and they controlled European Russia until the 16th century when Ivan the 
Terrible began the expansion of the Russian Empire, defeating the Tatars decisively at 
Kazan.1 
In 1552 the Russians finally captured Kazan, having fought a concentrated 
campaign for most of the year to achieve victory. This signaled the end of Tatar 
independence, and from then on they were to be subjects within the border of an 
imperial Russia, Ivan IV having established the patterns of Russian rule over its Muslim 
subjects for the next four and a half centuries (Pelenski 1974, 46). Both Moscow and 
Kazan hold lasting monuments to this conquest, with St. Basil’s in the Red Square of 
Moscow being built to commemorate Ivan’s victory, and the buildings of Kazan’s 
kremlin rebuilt to reflect Russian sensibilities. Between 66,000 and 100,000 Russians-- 
by default, “Christians”-- were “liberated” from Kazanian hands during the course of the 
conquest. Providing for their safety had been another motivation for the fighting, at 
least outwardly (Pelenski 1974, 238). 
The period directly after Russian conquest was not exactly easy for the Tatars. 
Modern day Kazan boasts a beautiful canal running through the city near the Kremlin. 
Today this canal is a quaint, romantic walk near the bustling economic heart of the city. 
Its construction, however, was akin to the “Peace Walls” of Belfast, with the canal 
signifying the line between the area the Russians lived in and the “Tatar suburbs.” 
From the beginning, despite Imperial pro-Orthodox/Russian policy and rhetoric, the 
Tatars and the Russians enjoyed a good deal of cooperation after the Russian 
conquest, at least among the elites. Before too long Tatar elites had assumed fairly 
powerful roles within Russian society. The attitude towards common Tatars was 
considerably less magnanimous, though. Some were even deported, to the north to 
work on Russia’s naval fleet (Akiner 2005, 57). 
The Russians made a concerted effort to convert and Christianize the Tatars. 
Those who did convert were called Kryashen, and over time came to be seen as an 
entirely different people group within the region. Still, though, the Tatars did not convert 
en masse. Bukharaev thinks that part of the reason Kazanians did not convert is that 
they had no real economic or political incentive to do so (Bukharaev 2000, 292). 
Russians were always given the most important jobs in the region, and those jobs that 
were made available to the Tatar elite were available regardless of religion. Over the 
course of the next two centuries things remained difficult for the Tatars. Catherine the 
Great eased the restrictions on the Tatars somewhat, and even allowed an assembly to 
form with jurisdiction over religious and civil matters. Things weren’t perfect, and even 
                                                
1 Kazan is the capitol of what would become Tatarstan. St. Basil’s Cathedral in Moscow’s Red 
Square was constructed to commemorate Ivan the Terrible’s victories over the Tatars, 
culminating in the conquest of Kazan. The church’s domes each represent a victory in the 
Tsar’s campaign. 
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after the emancipation of serfs, some Tatars chose to immigrate to Turkey rather than 
stay in Russia (Akiner 2004, 58). 
2. National Consciousness and Soviet Rule 
In 1910, only 182,653 people lived in Kazan. Of these, only 30,486 were Tatar (Rorlich 
1986, 77). One hundred years later, more than one million people live in Kazan, with a 
roughly equal ethnic split. This follows the general pattern of Soviet demographics. 
During the eighty years of Soviet rule the entire USSR urbanized at an impressively 
quick pace. Tatarstan was no exception, and by the time the USSR fell apart the 
republic had changed from a rural to an urban, industrialized area. The transition from 
urban to rural was eased somewhat by the presence of the Jadids, Islamic reformers 
whose influence will be explained in greater depth below, but many of the normal 
effects of urbanization, combined with Soviet anti-religious policy, kept conflict to a 
minimum. Anti-religious persecution did not acknowledge creedal lines, so Muslims 
were repressed just as Christians were. As a result, a certain amount of solidarity 
emerged among religious Tatars and religious Christians. Professor Vagapova said 
while being interviewed, “A religious Orthodox Russian is closer to me than a non-
religious Tatar.” (Vagapova2010). 
Atheist propaganda was not the most effective policy for dampening Tatar identity 
at any rate, since prior to their conception of themselves as “Tatar” the Tatars had seen 
themselves as “Muslim.” Gordon Hahn traces the beginnings of entrenched, self-
conscious Tatar nationalism to the reforms of the Jadid movement, which had as its 
initial goal the improvement of education, but eventually went far further than that. The 
Jadids can be understood in the larger intellectual context of the Russian Empire at the 
time, as the decade they emerged in was a highly rationalist/modernizing one. They 
won an internal battle with the Qadimists, who were more traditional (Hahn 2007, 176-
177). Rorlich notes “the early Tatar reformers approached Islam not only as a religion 
but also as a culture that united the spiritual and temporal on a religious foundation.” 
(ibid., 104) Even as the Tatars embraced their own literary language in the 19th century, 
urbanized during the 20th century, they found themselves persecuted by the authorities 
for their religious beliefs, they did not give up the idea of Islam as fundamental to their 
national, Tatar identity. Indeed, Rorlich notes “the move toward a Tatar literary 
language was also perhaps the key point in the transition from a purely Islamic identity 
to a still-Islamic, but also national, Tatar identity” (ibid., 67). 
A final consequence of Soviet policy was the marginalization and elimination of 
internal dissent. In this sense, the Tatars and Tatarstan in particular were not much 
different from the rest of the USSR. During the Revolution the Bolshevik movement 
managed to arrest or cause the flight of many of the top nationalists/separatists in 
Tatarstan, which undoubtedly set back any sort of nationalist movement by decades 
and contributed to the generally peaceful relations between Christians and Muslims 
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(Rorlich 2007, 133). With the loudest separatist voices gone, and Christian and Muslim 
alike discriminated against by the Soviet regime, neither side could afford to indulge in 
petty conflict with the other. Instead of arraying themselves against Russian Christians, 
the Tatars directed their energy at the Communist Party. The local party, controlled by 
Sultan Galiev, was a constant irritant to the Soviet administration. Even in embracing 
Communism in Tatarstan, Galiev’s followers retained a distinctly Tatar, thus Muslim, 
identity, going so far as to release a statement decrying the proletariat of the revolution 
for failing to treat minority groups with equality (Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay 
1967, 114-115).2 
Tatar leaders were able to keep a hold of their people’s identity, even in the face of 
increased Soviet pressure, and even attained for themselves a measure of 
autonomous control. However, the creation of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (ASSR) didn’t solve all the post-revolution problems, since the boundaries of 
the ASSR were arbitrarily drawn, leaving a majority of Tatars residing outside the 
boundaries of the Republic (Rorlich 1986, 138). Indeed, the simultaneous creation of 
the Bashkir ASSR was an attempt to cripple the Tatar nationalist movement within the 
Soviet Union by stranding a large number of Tatars outside the boundaries of their own 
ASSR (Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay 1967, 126). Rorlich describes post-World 
War II Tatarstan as a model of “cultural resilience,” with the Tatars clinging 
determinedly to their heritage (ibid., 157). Rorlich even points to the comparative 
strength if Islam, in particular a brand of Sufism, in Tatarstan as an example of the 
group’s reaction to “the sterile and impersonal nature of a secular doctrine imposed 
from above.” (ibid., 165). Despite the best efforts of the Soviet authorities, the creation 
of the ASSR, now the Republic of Tatarstan, gave the Tatars unprecedented control 
over their domestic affairs.  
3.  The Federal 1990s 
President of the Republic, Mintimer Shaimiev, took advantage of the reforms of 
Perestroika to secure for the region even more autonomy, so that at the height of its 
privileges, it functioned in a way analogous to Scotland in the United Kingdom. These 
powers have been scaled back in recent years due to the reforms of Vladimir Putin, but 
Tatarstan is still allowed a great deal of autonomy in conducting its affairs. One 
particularly important piece of autonomy that the Tatars have won for themselves is the 
right to use their language in official business in the Republic. The number of Tatar 
language schools in Tatarstan and the surrounding regions has grown by leaps and 
bounds over the past twenty years (Vagapova 2010). Tatars enjoy a significant 
                                                
2 The statement, quoted in its entirety herein, is worth reading all the way through, if only for 
its audacity. 
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numerical advantage within their republic, but it isn’t so great that the desires of the 
Russian minority can be ignored.3  Additionally, the area of Tatarstan is very rich in 
natural resources, making it an industrial centre within Russia. This continuous flow of 
capital has ensured that the region has stayed prosperous, particularly in comparison 
to the more isolated Islamic Republics within Russia.  
 “(Raphael) Khakimov pointed out that in Russia democracy was understood merely 
as a voting procedure which determines the majority opinion. Since Russians constitute 
82 per cent of the Russian Federation’s populations, they do not recognize the rights of 
national or social minorities. Therefore, the non-Russians support democracy only 
inasmuch as it gives freedom to nations”(Kondrashov 2000, 77). This is why Russia’s 
national minorities pushed so hard for the powers that they won for themselves. It was 
only in a federal system with powerful checks on the ethnic Russians’ power that 
minorities could feel protected. As the largest minority group in the country, the Tatars 
led the way on this question. 
While the Union Republics of the USSR made pushes for independence, nationalist 
Tatar leadership took that same opportunity for them within Russia. In order to 
accomplish their objectives Tatar leaders had to play a delicate balancing act between 
Boris Yeltsin and his reformers and the Communist Party leadership.“ To resolve the 
crisis, in April 1990 Gorbachev rushed through the USSR Supreme Soviet a legislation 
package which was designed to head off the political initiative of the Baltic republics. Its 
‘carrot’ part included concessions of greater powers to the republics in the economic 
sphere. In order to pass this part without a hitch, Gorbachev had to accommodate the 
demands of the autonomous republics” (Kondrashov 2000, 101). The Tatar leadership 
jumped at this opportunity and used their strengthened position to negotiate for broader 
rights, and in this they were tacitly encouraged by Yeltsin’s own work to attain Russian 
independence from the Soviet Union. At first Yeltsin seemed as though he could be an 
ally in the nationalists’ quest for independence, but it soon became clear that his 
indulgence of the Tatar nationalists was only for instrumental reasons. 
While Yeltsin and Gorbachev were negotiating the federation treaty to be adopted 
towards Russia and the Soviet Union, Shamiev insisted on participating in negotiations 
as an equal party as the representative of Tatarstan. “Gorbachev, sensing an ally 
where before there had been opposition, was encouraging” (Lloyd 1998, 177). Shamiev 
had previously been a critic of the Soviet government and the ways that the Soviet 
Union had treated Tatarstan. Knowing that he was unlikely to get a better deal from 
Yeltsin, Shamiev decided to throw his force with Gorbachev. Knowing that Shamiev 
could play spoiler, both Yeltsin and Gorbachev accommodated Tatarstan’s demands to 
                                                
3 Russian Census Information, accessed Jan 12, 2010. Current population of Tatars within 
Tatarstan is roughly 2 million, while ethnic Russians number approximately 1.5 million. 
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the extent that they could, working out the federation treaty that is still broadly operated 
under. 
For one thing, Yeltsin was a big blow to the hopes of the nationalists in Tatarstan, since 
he peeled off a lot of their support by promising democracy. People were willing to give 
up independence if the seemingly more attainable goal of democracy in Russia and 
Tatarstan was available (Kondrashov 2000, 138) “At this point, Gorbachev was 
committed to maintaining central control of eight key policy spheres:  
(1) defense and state security;  
(2) foreign policy, trade, and customs; 
(3) human rights; 
(4) a unified monetary policy, prices, and standards; 
(5) energy supplies;  
(6) transportation; 
(7) environmentalregulation;and 
(8) scientific and technical progress.“ (Gleason 1992, 150) 
Gorbachev had reached the limit of the freedoms he was willing to grant to 
troublesome groups like the Tatars, and Yeltsin stepped into that breach. He spoke in 
Tatarstan of letting the Tatars (and all other minority governments) have broad 
autonomy in conducting their affairs, even of independence for them. On the one hand, 
this ensured that he had the support of these people in his struggle against the 
communist leadership. On the other hand it emboldened nationalist sentiment in these 
areas and made it difficult for him to maintain Russia’s territorial stability once he 
prevailed in that fight (Kondrashov 2000, 142). 
By 1990, Tatarstan had declared its territorial and cultural sovereignty and its 
leadership made moves to consolidate those gains. The region’s strategic importance 
gave nationalist Tatars a strong hand to play with Yeltsin, and they used it to full 
advantage.“ The draft Yeltsin constitution (1992), following through on the summer 
convention, equalized the status of the federation subjects, converting Russia from an 
asymmetrical to a symmetrical federation” (Sharlet 1994, 123).This represented a small 
step backwards for the nationalists from the gains Gorbachev had been willing to 
accede to, but it was perhaps the best they could have hoped for given Yeltsin’s 
popularity at the start of his administration. The draft constitution eliminated any talk of 
sovereignty for national republics like Tatarstan, but granted them the ability to control 
their finances, elect their own leadership, and promote a national culture and language. 
These were key gains for Tatar nationalists to consolidate. 
4. Religious Friction and Accord 
The religious history of Tatarstan also has helped to ensure continuing peace in the 
region. The Tatars are the descendents of the Mongol Horde, and for several centuries 
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after the Mongols swept across the face of Eurasia the Tatars enjoyed the upper hand 
in relations with the Russians. While the Tatars certainly were not entirely benevolent 
rulers, they did share the Mongol temperament towards differing religions; that is, 
religion was unimportant so long as the necessary tribute was paid on time (Bukharaev 
2000, 288). By the time the Russians turned the tables in the 16th century religious 
tolerance was hardwired into the Tatar outlook. Despite initial attempts to force 
conversion upon Tatars and to marginalize them within their region relations were 
normalized under Catherine the Great, and further liberalization occurred under 
Alexander II. (Mukhetdinov 2010). 
The Tatars adapted their faith to their context,  
“The Shariah does not function in Russia, and Orthodox Christians 
comprise the majority of the population. Muslims should settle into this 
way of life... This country is no worse and no better than Muslim states, it 
is simply different. This is our fate and our destiny-- to work out the 
experience of the true path in these conditions. We cannot be made a 
Saudi Arabia, and we can hardly become Christian Europe. We are as 
we are. The date tree does not grow on Russian soil.”—Rafael Khakimov 
(cited in Hahn 1998, 184). 
This flexibility has allowed Russians and Tatars to live together in peace since the 
conquests of Ivan the Terrible. One notable example of the independence of Tatar 
Muslims was their attitudes towards prayer during the Soviet era. In a break with 
tradition, Tatar mullahs began to allow women into the mosques to pray with the men 
during services. This had a dual effect: it brought the Tatar community together, and it 
made the differences between Tatars and Russian Christians slightly less distinct. The 
mullahs are also flexible on the aspect of daily prayer. The whole program of religion 
among Tatars is more relaxed than elsewhere in the Muslim world, largely because of 
Soviet restrictions (Rorlich 1986, 163). 
The relationship between Muslim and Christian clergy is, at the least, cordial. When 
the Kazan Kremlin was being restored and the Qol Sharrif mosque being rebuilt within 
the Kremlin walls, Patriarch of Russia Alexei returned to Kazan the most sacred copy 
of the city’s distinctive icon, the Kazan Mother of God. The Tatars saw this gesture as a 
deeply respectful acknowledgement of Tatarstan and Tatar culture on the part of the 
Russian Orthodox Church (Vagapova 2010). During the ceremony, the Patriarch 
emphasized the cooperation that Christian and Muslims within Russia were capable of, 
saying that such cooperation enabled the groups “to sustain peace in society, to 
cooperate in preventing moral foundations from being ruined, and to uphold traditional 
cultural values.” (Novosti 2005)Indeed, Damir-Khazra Mukhetdinov, a Tatar Muslim 
leader in the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, which borders Tatarstan, states that the 
relationship with the church is positive. The two groups share similar values between 
the Bible and the Qur’an; they have solidarity with each other (Mukhetdinov 2010). 
Gordon Hahn characterizes Tatarstan’s official clergy as slightly more conservative 
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than the Tatar intelligentsia, but they are also financially dependent upon the 
government for funding (Hahn 2007, 185). 
Relations, however, are not perfect. Mukhetdinov notes that some of the younger 
Orthodox clergy members have emerged from seminary radicalized, and he also allows 
that every once in a while, one sees negative speeches about Tatars, for example. 
Overall, religious people—Russian and Tatar—are generally more tolerant of each 
other than non-religious people. He does not appreciate work done by the Orthodox 
Church to proselytize to Muslims, believing that the two religions should not be 
competing for converts, but rather competing to do good works (Mukhetdinov 2010). In 
November, a Tatar priest was killed after evening mass, presumably by a Muslim 
assailant. Father Danil Sysoyev was known for his anti-Muslim stance, and he openly 
encouraged Muslims to convert to Christianity. He was notorious for comparing Islam 
with the Communist Party and the Nazis. Muslim leaders condemned the killing, but at 
least one who preferred to remain anonymous allowed, “He was an odious figure.” (The 
Independent, 2009). 
 
Conclusion: Putin’s Federal Reset 
Sometimes the Russian government is the bull in the china shop, creating tension 
between groups. Mukhetdinov says that the Russian government does not see shades 
of grey, and he thinks that this is a bad stance for the government to take. The 
government’s deals depend solely on the situation immediately, not based on the future 
or long-term projections. The government is focused on now. “The government works 
as a firefighter only at the last possible moment, but they do not engage in any fire 
prevention. They only respond when things start to burn.” Mukhetdinov describes the 
deals that the government brokers as not “literate” to the situations (ibid. 2010). 
Additionally, the Russian government had made moves in recent years to claw back 
some of the control ceded to national republics by Yeltsin. For example, no longer are 
the Presidents of Autonomous Republics elected by their constituents; rather, they 
serve at the pleasure of the President in Moscow. This process is unfolding in 
Tatarstan currently. President Shaimiev is reaching the end of his term, and has 
announced that he will step down from it in order to let a younger generation of Tatar 
leadership step forward (St. Petersburg Times 2010) Given the fact that he can only 
serve if Federation President Medvedev nominates him for another term, it is difficult to 
see this as anything other than Moscow wanting new blood and giving Shaimiev the 
chance to bow out gracefully. 
While the Russian government has been helpful in allowing that Tatars—like other 
national minorities—teach their native language in state schools, this has not been an 
unqualified success. Ethnic Russians within Tatarstan are mostly monolingual since 
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they are not encouraged to learn Tatar, meaning that if Tatars wish to do business or 
communicate with Russians, they must be bilingual. Further trouble arises when it 
comes time to teach history and culture in Tatarstan. The Russian government has 
made it mandatory that all children in state schools be given a course in Russian 
cultural history. By default, this has meant teaching of “Orthodox” culture, as this is 
considered to be a defining Russian cultural feature. Professor Vagapova says that this 
requirement would not bother most Tatars if a corresponding class on Russian Muslim 
culture was taught, but this is forbidden. From Vagapova’s point of view, Russia is 
multicultural, so this stance does not make sense. Islam is also part of Russian culture, 
so it is wrong to exclude it from the schools, particularly those schools in predominantly 
Muslim regions (Vagapova 2010). 
Another particularly awkward moment occurred when conservative Muslims in 
Tatarstan protested at the Christian symbols on their passports, and Muslim women 
demanded to be allowed to wear their headscarves while being photographed for their 
passports. Muslim authorities intervened in each case, assuring pious Muslims that it 
was permissible to carry around items with crosses on them so long as the crosses 
were not being worshipped, and obtaining the right for women to be photographed with 
their scarves on (BBC 2005). Vagapova meets periodically with cultural and religious 
leaders in the Nizhny Novgorod region, but Mukhetdinov notes that these groups are 
few and far between in Russia. From his perspective, it is a shame that Russians are 
more knowledgeable of Americans and the English than of the minorities within their 
own country (Mukhetdinov 2010). 
Still, Mukhetdinov notes that the serious problems between Tatars and Russians 
are in the past, and he views Tatar efforts to gain more control over Tatarstan positively 
(ibid. 2010). As we have seen, a variety of factors are at play in Tatar-Russian 
relations. Despite many historical reasons for antagonism and numerous small 
controversies in recent years, the inertia of cultural tolerance between Tatars and 
Russians has held strong. Buoyed by strong religious commitments to tolerance, broad 
economic freedom and prosperity for the Tatar minority, and a common Soviet foil, 
ethnic Russians and Tatars have been able to stay on good cultural terms with each 
other. Vagapova quoted an old Tatar saying when asked about the prospects of the 
future, “I’m not good if my neighbor feels bad.” Tatars and Russians have lived together 
in peace for a long time. Of course, all Tatars are different, and all Russians are 
different; but economics and politics connect them to each other (Vagapova 2010). The 
Russian government’s role in this process is important. Starting from the Soviet period 
and working forward into the life of the Russian Federation, Russian authorities-- if not 
always Soviet authorities-- have understood the need to allow for regional autonomy in 
sensitive areas. Russia does not always get this formula right, as the cases in 
Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan show, but Tatarstan can at the very least provide 
some rough frameworks to begin orienting federalist policies in conflict regions around. 
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Up until very recently, Russia’s government took a very hands-off approach to 
Tatarstan, but the recent moves by the government to assert its control over the 
Republic show that this is changing. These moves probably will not upset the ethnic 
peace that reigns in the area, but they may engender antipathy towards the central 
government and embolden Tatar nationalists. In this, Russia, like all federations, faces 
a difficult balancing act. Federations facing ethnic division can take a lesson from 
Tatarstan in a number of ways, however. First, Russia and Tatarstan show that ethnic 
animosity can be overcome. The timetable for this could well be excruciatingly slow, 
however. Trust is not achieved in a day, or even in an election cycle, so all involved 
need to demonstrate patience and perseverance. Second, Tatarstan shows that a 
central government willing to devolve powers to a robust local government can work to 
diffuse resentment towards those groups in power. Third, non-governmental civil 
entities need to be encouraged to take up leadership roles within society, and to lay the 
foundations for ethnic cooperation. This facet has been critical in the development of 
Tatarstan, with the Jadids taking up this post within Tatar society. Much literature has 
already been published in this area, but robust civil society cannot develop in a 
vacuum; it needs the support of surrounding structures in order to work for positive 
change. 
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